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Abstract 
In Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated and applied to states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the decision was 
unanimous, the concurring opinions offered a revealing reflection of past 
constitutional battles and an intriguing vision of future conflicts. Both Justices 
Gorsuch and Thomas suggested resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as a more appropriate vehicle than the Due Process Clause for applying 
the prohibition on excessive fines to states. 
Justice Thomas took this proposal one step further. He suggested the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used instead of the Due Process 
Clause to address all fundamental rights. This would not be a simple exchange 
of constitutional sources to guide incorporation; the actual scope of fundamental 
rights would also be affected. Unlike the Due Process Clause, Justice Thomas 
found the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be more grounded in history and 
tradition, thereby offering the Court a guiding principle for distinguishing 
“fundamental rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do 
not.” The Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow for the application of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines to states. But under this 
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approach, other rights, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, would not be 
considered privileges of “American citizenship” entitled to constitutional 
protection. 
The consequences of resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause at 
the expense of the Due Process Clause are troubling and far-reaching. 
Renouncing over a century of precedent would result in the radical 
transformation of constitutional law and the weakening of fundamental rights. 
In the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment, rights and privileges are a distinction 
with a difference. 
I. Introduction 
In Timbs v. Indiana,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated and applied to 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
According to a unanimous Court, this safeguard is “‘fundamental to our 
scheme of ordered liberty,’ with ‘dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and 
tradition.’”3 Timbs is historically significant because the Court addressed one 
of the last remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated and 
applied to state and local governments. Until this decision, four provisions in 
the Bill of Rights had not yet been incorporated through the Due Process 
Clause and, therefore, were not conclusively applicable to states: (1) the 
Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering of troops in homes; (2) the 
Fifth Amendment’s right to a grand jury indictment in criminal cases; (3) the 
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases; and (4) the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines.4 To most scholars and jurists, 
this represented a constitutional anomaly. As Justice Gorsuch wryly noted 
during oral argument in Timbs, “And here we are in 2018 . . . still litigating 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really?”5 
While the Court’s decision was unanimous, the concurring opinions 
offered a revealing reflection of past constitutional battles and an intriguing 
vision of future conflicts. Both Justices Gorsuch and Thomas suggested 
resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a more appropriate vehicle than the Due Process Clause for 
applying the prohibition on excessive fines to states.6 
 
1. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
2. Id. at 687. 
3. Id. at 686–87 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)). 
4. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (5th ed. 2017). 
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091) 
[hereinafter Timbs Transcript]. Justice Kavanaugh offered a similar perspective during oral 
argument, asking whether it is “just too late in the day to argue that any of the Bill of Rights is not 
incorporated?” Id. at 33. 
6. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
While the Privileges or Immunities Clause is rarely considered by the Supreme Court, it has still 
received significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
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Justice Thomas took this proposal one step further.7 He suggested the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used instead of the Due Process 
Clause to address the existence of fundamental rights.8 This would not be a 
simple exchange of constitutional sources to guide incorporation; the actual 
scope of fundamental rights would also be affected. Unlike the Due Process 
Clause, Justice Thomas found the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be more 
grounded in history and tradition, thereby offering the Court a guiding 
principle for distinguishing “‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection 
from nonfundamental rights that do not.”9 The Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would, therefore, allow for the application of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines to states. But under this 
approach, other rights, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, would not be 
considered privileges of “American citizenship” entitled to constitutional 
protection. 
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Timbs and its broader 
implications for the protection of fundamental rights. While Timbs involves 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the prohibition on excessive fines, the 
case also highlights the ongoing debate regarding substantive due process, 
fundamental rights, and even reproductive autonomy. Part II of this Article 
reviews the Court’s unanimous opinion in Timbs, and Part III examines the 
concurring opinions and their call for resurrecting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Part IV then assesses the implications of this call and the 
shortcomings of this approach. The consequences of resurrecting the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause at the expense of the Due Process Clause are 
both troubling and far-reaching. Renouncing over a century of precedent 
would result in the radical transformation of constitutional law and the 
weakening of fundamental rights. And, it would represent the effective death 
of stare decisis as a guiding principle for the Court. 
 
AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014); Richard L. Aynes, Ink 
Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009); 
Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (1989). 
To be clear, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is distinct from the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which prohibits states from discriminating 
against non-state citizens. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
7. During the 2018–2019 term, Justice Thomas increased his criticism of well-established 
precedent. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Precedent, Meet Clarence Thomas. You May Not Get Along., 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/clarence-thomas-
supreme-court-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/X2RA-7W5Q]. 
8. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Throughout his tenure on the 
Court, Justice Thomas has expressed growing interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
9. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 692 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment)). 
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II. Timbs v. Indiana and the Due Process Clause 
Civil forfeiture has long been a controversial issue in the United States.10 
Under civil forfeiture laws, government actors can seize a person’s property 
that has allegedly been used in the commission of a crime. Such seizure can 
occur without even proving the person was guilty of the underlying crime. 
While civil forfeiture laws vary by state, many jurisdictions only require 
probable cause to seize assets they believe were used as part of criminal 
activity.11 If successful, government actors can then keep the property, 
whether it is real estate, cash, guns, or cars. Because of its financial benefits, 
state and local governments have been aggressive in their civil forfeiture 
practices. It has become a multimillion-dollar industry.12 
In May 2013, Tyson Timbs was arrested by Indiana state police and 
charged with dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit 
theft.13 He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to one year of home 
detention and five years of probation.14 As part of his sentence, he was 
assessed $1,203 in court-related fees and costs.15 While his criminal case was 
pending, state officials instituted civil forfeiture proceedings seeking title to 
Timbs’s 2009 Land Rover SUV, which he had been driving when he was 
arrested.16 According to the civil complaint, the vehicle had been used to 
facilitate the violation of a criminal statute and was subject to seizure under 
Indiana law.17 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the state’s 
request.18 It noted the Land Rover was worth more than four times the 
maximum $10,000 monetary fine that could be assessed against Timbs for 
his drug conviction.19 Accordingly, the vehicle’s forfeiture would have been 
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s offense and, therefore, 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.20 
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.21 While it 
 
10. See generally STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2d 
ed. 2013). 
11. Id. § 3-3, at 104–05. 
12. See generally DICK M. CARPENTER II, ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: 
THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE (2d ed. 2015); Note, How Crime Pays: The 
Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2018). 
13. State v. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d 472, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. Indiana law sets the maximum possible fine for felony violations at $10,000. IND. CODE 
§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (2019). 
20. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d at 477. 
21. Id. 
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acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court had yet to apply the Excessive Fines 
Clause to states, it concluded that the Clause did, in fact, apply.22 The Indiana 
Supreme Court granted review and reversed.23 Citing principles of federalism 
and the lack of controlling U.S. Supreme Court guidance, it held the 
Excessive Fines Clause constrains only federal action and is inapplicable to 
state action.24 
Arguing that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines 
applied to states, Timbs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review.25 
Timbs focused his argument on the applicability of the Due Process Clause 
as the proper mechanism for incorporating the Eighth Amendment. Timbs 
added a second argument—that the Excessive Fines Clause also applied to 
states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.26 The State of Indiana rejected both arguments and urged the 
Court to not consider whether incorporation should occur through the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.27 Significantly, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was not even at issue in the Indiana Supreme Court’s earlier 
decision.28 
A diverse coalition of conservative and liberal groups filed amicus briefs 
with the Supreme Court supporting Timbs. Their common interest stemmed 
from concerns with government overreach, including the seizure of private 
property through civil forfeiture programs. The ACLU, NAACP, and ABA 
as well as the Pacific Legal Foundation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
all filed amicus briefs in support of the proposition that the Excessive Fines 
Clause applied to state and local governments.29 Of the seventeen amicus 
briefs filed on Timbs’s behalf, most argued that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause. 
However, three amicus briefs argued in support of using the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as the more appropriate mechanism for incorporation.30 
 
22. Id. at 475 n.4. 
23. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2017). 
24. Id. at 1181, 1184. 
25. Brief for Petitioners at 37, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). 
26. Id. 
27. Brief for Respondent at 13, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). 
28. The Indiana Supreme Court briefly referenced the Privileges or Immunities Clause in its 
review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on incorporation. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d at 1183. 
29. See, e.g., Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the R Street Institute, the Fines and 
Fees Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal 
Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). 
30. Brief for the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, 
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief of Amicus Curiae Cause of Action 
Institute in Support of Petitioners at 2, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief 
of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioners, 
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). 
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In Timbs v. Indiana,31 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the Indiana Supreme Court.32 The question presented to the Court 
asked whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is “an 
‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”33 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the 
Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government at its adoption, a 
principle first set forth in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore.34 
This changed with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. 
Since then, the Court engaged in the selective incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights to the states on a case-by-case basis. Eventually, most of its provisions 
were incorporated.35 The Court made these determinations by reviewing the 
historical significance of the underlying right under consideration. According 
to Justice Ginsburg, “[a] Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, we have 
explained, if it is ‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,’ or ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”36 
Having identified the Court’s methodology for incorporation, Justice 
Ginsburg then proceeded to review the historical significance of the 
protection from excessive fines. She traced its lineage to the Magna Carta, 
the English Bill of Rights, and throughout English history.37 This protection 
also found traction in the American colonies as evidenced by the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights and, eventually, the Eighth Amendment.38 Justice 
Ginsburg indicated that when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 
1868, most states already granted protection from excessive fines.39 And 
today, “acknowledgment of the right’s fundamental nature remains 
widespread.”40 
In addition to the historical record, the Court also considered the Eighth 
Amendment’s practical significance. According to Justice Ginsburg, the 
protection against excessive fines was necessary to protect against 
government overreach that could undermine other constitutional liberties.41 
For example, excessive fines could be used “to retaliate against or chill the 
speech of political enemies.”42 They could also be used as a source of revenue 
 
31. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
32. Id. at 686–87. 
33. Id. at 686. 
34. Id. at 687 (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 
(1833)). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)). 
37. Id. at 687–88. 
38. Id. at 688. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 689. 
41. Id.  
42. Id. 
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in criminal proceedings, wholly unrelated to “the penal goals of retribution 
and deterrence.”43 In sum, both the historical record and practical concerns 
were overwhelmingly in support of incorporation. 
For these reasons, the Court held that the prohibition embodied in the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment was incorporated through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 And, once a Bill of 
Rights protection is incorporated, Justice Ginsburg indicated “there is no 
daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.”45 
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment applied with equal force to the states.46 
The case was then remanded to the Indiana state courts for further 
proceedings.47 
III. Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
Both Justices Gorsuch and Thomas issued concurring opinions in 
Timbs. In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch agreed that the historical evidence 
supported the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.48 Citing to Justice Thomas’s prior concurrence in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago and the work of several legal scholars, Justice 
Gorsuch suggested the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be the more 
appropriate vehicle for incorporation than the Due Process Clause.49 
Notwithstanding, he noted this distinction would not change the outcome of 
the Court’s decision.50 
In contrast, Justice Thomas only concurred in the Court’s judgment.51 
He acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment “makes the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines fully applicable to the States.”52 
He disagreed, however, on using the Due Process Clause to achieve this 
outcome: 
 
43. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)). 
44. Id. at 687. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 691. The Court also rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to 
civil in rem forfeiture. According to Justice Ginsburg, “[i]n considering whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates a protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right 
guaranteed—not each and every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply 
rooted.” Id. at 690. 
48. Id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
49. Id. (citing Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original 
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007); AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–214 (1998); MICHAEL 
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1986)). 
50. Id.  
51. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
52. Id.  
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Instead of reading the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
to encompass a substantive right that has nothing to do with ‘process,’ 
I would hold that the right to be free from excessive fines is one of the 
‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.53 
Justice Thomas previously argued in support of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, and against the Due Process Clause, in McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, a case that involved the incorporation of the Second Amendment 
and its application to state and local governments. In McDonald, Justice 
Thomas indicated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause appeared to grant 
U.S. citizens “a certain collection of rights.”54 But, he argued the scope of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause had been eviscerated by the Court in the 19th 
century in the aptly titled Slaughter-House Cases.55 As a result, the Court had 
used the Due Process Clause as the mechanism for protecting fundamental 
rights from state encroachment.56 To Justice Thomas, such an approach was 
both “curious” and a “legal fiction”—“[t]he notion that a constitutional 
provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, 
liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity 
for even the most casual user of words.”57 
In Timbs, Justice Thomas reiterated these criticisms of the Due Process 
Clause and called on the Court to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
address fundamental rights.58 He found the Court’s jurisprudence on 
substantive due process to be “oxymoronic” because it sought to address 
fundamental rights through a constitutional provision that was meant to 
address procedural rights.59 Because of the disconnect between the Due 
Process Clause and fundamental rights, Justice Thomas argued the Court was 
continually struggling to identify the scope of these substantive due process 
rights. He then identified two cases, Obergefell v. Hodges and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, where he asserted the Court’s efforts to define “the 
universe of ‘fundamental rights’” bordered “on meaningless.”60 As a result, 
Justice Thomas indicated the Court had failed to adhere to any “guiding 
principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from 
 
53. Id. Justice Thomas’s interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause precedes his tenure on 
the Court. See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989). 
54.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
55. Id. (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)). 
56. Id. at 809. 
57. Id. at 809, 811. 
58. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
59. Id. at 692. 
60. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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nonfundamental rights that do not.”61 
Because the Court’s substantive due process precedents had allowed the 
Court to fashion fundamental rights without any textual constraints, Justice 
Thomas stated it was “unsurprising that among these precedents are some of 
the Court’s most notoriously incorrect decisions.”62 He then cited Dred Scott 
v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade as two examples.63 
Having established the failings of the Due Process Clause, Justice 
Thomas proceeded to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the 
mechanism for applying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive 
fines to the states. Through an originalist lens, he noted the words 
“privileges” and “immunities” were synonymous with rights to the drafters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 And, these rights were protected from state 
infringement through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.65 Justice Thomas then conducted an extensive review of the 
historical record, from English common law through the American colonial 
experience and then from early state practice through the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.66 He concluded that this historical record confirmed 
the prohibition on excessive fines was an essential right and one entitled to 
protection from state encroachment: “[a]s a constitutionally enumerated right 
understood to be a privilege of American citizenship, the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines applies in full to the States.”67 
IV. Rights and Privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Distinction 
with a Difference 
In Timbs v. Indiana, the question presented to the Court was relatively 
simple and uncontroversial: “[i]s the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?”68 Given the overwhelming 
historical record in support of incorporation, it is not surprising that the 
Court’s opinion was affirmative and unanimous. 
While Justices Gorsuch and Thomas both agreed with the Court’s 
judgment, their reasoning differed. Justice Gorsuch raised, but did not 
resolve, whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause might serve as “the 
appropriate vehicle for incorporation” rather than the Due Process Clause.69 
 
61. Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393 (1857)). 
64. Id. at 692. 
65. Id. at 691. 
66. Id. at 693–98. 
67. Id. at 698. 
68. Id. at 686 (majority opinion). 
69. Id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 
10 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 98:1 
Beyond referencing Justice Thomas’s prior reasoning in McDonald, Justice 
Gorsuch did not expand on his own reasoning. 
Justice Thomas also expressed a preference for using the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in this case. His reasoning, however, extended well 
beyond the question of incorporation and delved into substantive due process 
and fundamental rights.70 According to Justice Thomas, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause should not only be used to apply the protections of the 
Bill of Rights to states. He argued it should also be used to define the nature 
of these rights. Such an approach would resurrect the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause from its irrelevance. To Justice Thomas, this would be 
consistent with the historical understanding of the words “privileges or 
immunities.”71 And, it would allow the Court to end its problematic reliance 
on the Due Process Clause to address fundamental rights.72 
But not all rights would be recognized as “privileges or immunities” 
subject to constitutional protection. This is the real significance of Justice 
Thomas’s methodology. Unlike the Due Process Clause, Justice Thomas 
believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide the Court with 
textual constraints to guide its jurisprudence on fundamental rights.73 This 
would provide a “guiding principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that 
warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do not.”74 Significantly, 
this methodology would apply to both enumerated and unenumerated rights. 
In Timbs, for example, a review of English and American history 
revealed the prohibition on excessive fines “has been consistently recognized 
as a core right worthy of constitutional protection.”75 As such, Justice 
Thomas believed it was a “privilege of American citizenship” entitled to 
protection under the Eighth Amendment.76 
While other fundamental rights were not at issue in Timbs, Justice 
Thomas offered some ideas on which rights would not be considered a 
privilege of American citizenship. He cited both Obergefell v. Hodges and 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey as cases that reflected the Court’s inability to 
develop or apply a guiding principle for defining fundamental rights.77 His 
analysis suggests the rights at issue in those cases—same-sex marriage and 
abortion—would not be considered privileges of American citizenship 
 
70. Id. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
71. Id. 
72. But see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory 
of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019) (arguing that an originalist 
approach to the Due Process Clause can support substantive due process). 
73. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
74. Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment)). 
75. Id. at 698. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 692 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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entitled to constitutional protection.78 Justice Thomas also referred to both 
Dred Scott v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade as examples “of the Court’s most 
notoriously incorrect decisions” in the realm of substantive due process.79 
As a rhetorical argument, Justice Thomas’s conflation of Dred Scott—
a case universally recognized as the worst constitutional decision in history—
and Roe is to be expected. It is a connection that is routinely made by critics 
of substantive due process.80 Other justices have made similar connections 
between Dred Scott and reproductive autonomy cases, including Planned 
Parenthood.81 References to Dred Scott also appear in marriage equality 
cases.82 And yet, these rhetorical connections are challenged as often as they 
are raised.83 
As a legal argument, these connections are also subject to criticism. 
Many jurists and scholars argue that Dred Scott was the foundation for 
substantive due process.84 There is certainly some debate on this point.85 But 
the flaw in Dred Scott was not that substantive due process was arguably used 
to address fundamental rights. Instead, the Court’s flaw was using substantive 
due process to protect the alleged property rights of slave owners and failing 
to recognize the liberty rights of African Americans. By comparison, Roe 
acknowledged that reproductive autonomy was an essential right entitled to 
protection from government encroachment.86 In other words, Roe was correct 
because it did precisely what the Court in Dred Scott failed to do: accord 
primacy to personal autonomy over the coercive power of government.87 
The Due Process Clause has long been used to protect a litany of privacy 
rights as fundamental rights. As Justice Thomas points out, same-sex 
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marriage and abortion are two such rights; but, many more exist. These 
include the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right 
to keep one’s family together, and the right to make medical care decisions.88 
Other rights are also protected under the Due Process Clause, including the 
right of access to courts.89 Even the Court’s jurisprudence on personal 
jurisdiction has been guided by the Due Process Clause.90 These are 
engrained principles of constitutional jurisprudence that could be lost if the 
Court pivots from the Due Process Clause to the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. 
Despite his entreaties, Justice Thomas does not offer a convincing 
explanation for why the Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide any 
more of a guiding principle for elucidating fundamental rights than the Due 
Process Clause.91 In fact, there is none, although Justice Thomas would argue 
otherwise.92 But even if the words “privileges” and “immunities” were 
synonymous with “rights” to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, they 
still offer no meaningful way for determining which “privileges or 
immunities” are rights subject to protection. Courts would still be required to 
conduct a review of the historical record, as Justice Ginsburg did through the 
Due Process Clause in Timbs. 
Some scholars have offered a guiding principle for applying the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but it is one that eviscerates the fundamental 
rights subject to constitutional protection. This narrow principle would apply 
the protections of the Privileges or Immunities Clause only to enumerated 
rights—those rights appearing in the first eight amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.93 Unenumerated rights would not be considered “privileges or 
immunities.” However, this approach is subject to its own criticisms, as the 
historical record offers a broader understanding behind the original meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.94 
Applying the Privileges or Immunities Clause in lieu of the Due Process 
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Clause to address fundamental rights would raise other issues. By its terms, 
the Clause only addresses “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States,” a point Justice Ginsburg recognized during oral argument in 
Timbs.95 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas repeatedly referred to the 
rights of “English subjects,” “Englishmen,” “free m[e]n,” and “citizens.”96 
This raises the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would differentiate between the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals in the United States.97 Such a distinction finds little support 
in the Court’s existing jurisprudence on fundamental rights.98 It is, of course, 
also deeply troubling and may conflict with other constitutional provisions, 
including the Equal Protection Clause.99 But to those seeking to limit the 
constitutional rights of foreign nationals, Justice Thomas offers a 
methodology to achieve their goal.100 
Finally, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, by its terms, only applies to states.101 Applying Justice 
Thomas’s methodology to assess fundamental rights would thus leave the 
Court with a stark choice: accept that the protection of fundamental rights 
differs based on the identity of the government actor restricting those rights, 
or apply the same methodology to both federal and state action because “there 
is no daylight between the federal and state conduct” that the Constitution 
prohibits or requires.102 The former is logically inconsistent and contrary to 
the Court’s modern approach to the Bill of Rights. The latter would result in 
the profound retrenchment of fundamental rights if the Court accepts a 
narrow interpretation of the rights protected under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and applies this interpretation to both the federal and state 
governments. 
In sum, there are compelling reasons for why the Due Process Clause is 
preferable to the Privileges or Immunities Clause in addressing fundamental 
rights. The Privileges or Immunities Clause does not solve “the guiding 
principle” problem. In fact, it creates its own problems by having to address 
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the rights of foreign nationals as well as managing the federal-state 
distinction. There are also practical consequences that cannot be overstated. 
Countless decisions would be affected, including right to privacy cases, 
incorporation cases, and even cases addressing personal jurisdiction.103 By 
renouncing a century of precedent and dozens of decisions, the Court would 
also signal the demise of stare decisis as its own guiding principle. The Court 
would cause profound harm to its institutional legitimacy, and its past 
decisions would be exposed to greater scrutiny and less deference. 
Tellingly, the Court laid the foundation for this development in a series 
of decisions issued after Timbs. In Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,104 the 
Court considered whether to overrule its earlier decision in Nevada v. Hall 
limiting state sovereign immunity.105 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas 
noted that “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable command.’”106 And, 
significantly, he added that stare decisis is “at its weakest when we interpret 
the Constitution.”107 Justice Thomas then listed four factors the Court 
considers in deciding whether to overturn precedent: “the quality of the 
decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related decisions; legal 
developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.”108 Because 
the Court found its earlier decision in Hall was inconsistent with the historical 
record and contrary to the Court’s more recent opinions, it overruled that 
decision.109 In dissent, Justice Breyer expressed concern with the Court’s 
reasoning and acknowledged the consequences of disregarding stare decisis, 
including its impact on legal stability and societal expectations.110 The 
Court’s rejection of stare decisis caused Justice Breyer “to wonder which 
cases the Court will overrule next.”111 
Justice Breyer’s query about the future of stare decisis was raised anew 
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by Justice Kagan a few weeks later in another case that saw the Court again 
overturn established precedent. In Knick v. Twp. of Scott,112 the Court  
overturned decades of precedent and held that property owners are not 
required to seek compensation under state law in state court before bringing 
a federal takings claim.113 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan referenced 
Justice Breyer’s query about the future of stare decisis and noted, “[w]ell, 
that didn’t take long.”114 She then added, “[n]ow one may wonder yet 
again.”115 
V. Conclusion 
For over 160 years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process 
Clause to protect a discrete set of fundamental rights and no more.116 For over 
140 years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to protect an even narrower set of rights.117 To now replace the Due 
Process Clause with the Privileges or Immunities Clause would run counter 
to this robust history and jurisprudential tradition.118 
For decades, the Supreme Court has rejected the distinction between 
rights and privileges in constitutional analysis.119 It would be regrettable if 
the Court resurrects this distinction to limit fundamental rights through the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. That this reasoning is found in Timbs v. 
Indiana—a decision that sought to curtail government overreach—is 
somewhat ironic. In the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment, rights and 
privileges are a distinction with a difference. 
Postscript 
In Fall 2019, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Ramos v. 
Louisiana to address whether the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a 
unanimous jury verdict applies in state courts.120 The text of the Sixth 
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Amendment does not refer to jury unanimity; it is, however, a principle the 
Court has long accepted.121 While the Court has previously held this 
requirement applies in the case of six person juries, it has also held that it 
does not apply in cases of eleven or twelve person juries.122 By granting 
certiorari in Ramos, at least four members of the Court have expressed an 
interest in again revisiting the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 
In briefing, Ramos argues the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict 
is fully incorporated through the Due Process Clause.123 He also argues the 
same outcome is required by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In contrast, 
Louisiana rejects the assertion that unanimity is required under either 
provision.124 
Constitutional revolutions seldom happen without warning. They are 
often the result of a gradual process that culminates in a moment of profound 
change. Given renewed interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is 
evident this issue will be raised anew in Ramos, thereby offering Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch another opportunity to convince their colleagues to the 
ascension of privileges and the erosion of rights. 
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